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CORPORATIONS
Lewis Collens*
In this review of the developments in Illinois CorporationLaw that have
occurred since his article of a year ago, Professor Collens analyzes judicial
interpretations in four major areas of corporate activity. His examination
focuses on the liability of officers and directors, with a special caveat to
members of the legal profession serving in such capacity; the dependent
dividend rights of a parent corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary;
the attendant problems in the purchase and sale of close corporation stock
and the related issues arising from the determination that corporate conduct
constitutes oppression of minority shareholders.

A

LIABILITY OF OFFICERS & DIRECTORS

TTORNEYS often serve as directors and officers of closely held
corporations that they represent. However, as indicated in Sears
v. Weissman,' this situation "may turn out to be fraught with
'2
danger for the honest and well intentioned but unwary lawyer."
In Sears, the trial court held an attorney acting as diretor and secretary liable to an unpaid creditor of a dissolved corporation. While
the appellate court reversed the lower court, thereby relieving the
attorney of liability, it specifically reminded the members of the bar
that there is no statutory reason to serve as members of corporate
boards.' This statement is a clear warning to the profession to be
wary of accepting directorships.
Before considering the merits of Sears and the reasons for the
court's warnings to the bar, I think it is useful to consider why attorneys serve as members of corporate boards. The Sears court suggests two reasons: glamour and the hope of financial return. While
a certain amount of glamour may attach to those who are directors
of public corporations, it is hard to believe that attorneys consider
it glamourous to hold directorships in close corporations. More
likely, attorneys seek directorships in the belief that the board seat
* Associate Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology-Chicago-Kent
College of Law.
1. 6 Il.App. 3d 827, 286 N.E.2d 777 (1972).
2. 6 Ill. App. 3d at 835, 286 N.E.2d at 784.
3. Id.
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will insure their receiving the corporation's legal business. 4 I doubt,
however, that it is possible to establish empirically a causal connection between board membership and placement of legal business.
It is undoubtedly true that most attorneys who sit on close corporation boards are attorneys for those corporations. However, they sit
on the board because they are the corporate attorney; they are not
the corporate attorney because they sit on the board.
If it is not clear what attorneys have to gain from membership
on corporate boards, it is clear that they have much to lose. No
member of the legal profession should need to be reminded that
today corporate directors are targets of substantial numbers of not
only shareholder derivative suits and direct shareholder suits but also
consumer and governmental actions. Furthermore, with the escalating demands for corporate responsibility, it is safe to predict that
corporate directors will be involved in an ever-increasing amount
of litigation.
To the extent that it is believed either by client or counsel that
the attorney's presence at board meetings is necessary, there is no
reason why he cannot attend without being a member of the board.
If the attorney feels uncomfortable attending a meeting without a
formal role, he can be appointed secretary of the meeting (not corporate secretary) and be responsible for preparing minutes of the
meeting.
A review of the merits of Sears invites consideration of one frequent criticism of directors-that they fail to take an active interest
in the corporation, i.e., that they fail to direct., Sears illustrates
one dimension of this problem. In relieving the attorney from liability, the appellate court indicated that one of the "potent factors"
operating in his favor was that he had "no knowledge whatsoever
regarding any financial affairs"6 of the company. This remarkable
4. This may be based on the assumption either that the attorney's presence will
enable him to use his charismatic charm or that he will make valuable contributions
to deliberations on substantive business decisions.
5. Implicit in the complaints about inactive directors is the assumption that
active participation on their parts would result in different corporate actions. There
is no empirical support for this proposition.

See J. Galbraith, ECONOMICS AND TIM

PUBLIC PuRposa 218 (1973), where the author suggests that no change in corporate
boards can make corporations more socially responsible in terms of his criticisms
of the modern corporation.
6. 6 Ill. App. 3d at 834, 286 N.E.2d at 783.
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proposition obviously did not trouble the court and probably will not
trouble many readers of the opinion because the attorney was not
in any way actively involved in what amounted to a scheme to
defraud the plaintiff. Nonetheless, one would expect anyone who
was truly functioning as a director of a company, particularly an
attorney, to have some knowledge of the financial affairs of the company. To hold that this type of ignorance relieves a director from
liability is simply to encourage directors to refrain from critical inquiry regarding the corporation's affairs.
In fairness to the Sears court, it is important to keep in mind
the precise issue with which it was confronted: whether the attorney
"assented to" an improper distribution of the corporation's assets.7
The plaintiff's money had been deposited in the corporation's bank
account and then paid out to the two shareholders of the company
who comprised the majority of the corporation's three-man board.
The holding that the attorney had not "assented to" the distribution
was consistent with prior Illinois case law.' The court in effect affirmed the proposition that the active members of the board are not
considered agents of the inactive ones---even where the inactive ones
have clearly decided to "entrust" management to the active members.9
While most readers of Sears are apt to believe that the court
reached a just result, the court must have been troubled by the implication that ignorance of corporate affairs is a good defense for
director defendants. Hence, the court warned the bar about accepting directorships-a warning which I believe is also an indication
that in the future the court may be less willing to reach the same
result.
7. § 42.1 of the Bus. CoRp. AcT, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.42-1 (1971),
imposes liability on directors who "vote for or assent to the ... distribution of the
assets . . . if, at the time of such . . . distribution, the corporation is insolvent.

8. Lewis v. Montgomery, 145 Ill.
30, 33 N.E. 880 (1893).
9. Id. But note that directors have been deemed to have assented to transactions that they did not specifically approve, DeMet's, Inc. v. Insull, 122 F.2d 755
(7th Cir. 1941) (where action was approved by an executive committee and liable
directors had authorized creation of the executive committee); Slater v. Taylor,
241 Il1. 102, 89 N.E. 271 (1909) (where directors held personally liable for acts of
agent hired by board even though specific acts giving rise to liability were not
authorized by board).
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Kern v. Chicago & E. Ill. R.R. 10 (C&EI) sharply raises the

question: how is it possible for directors to discharge fairly their
fiduciary duty to all shareholders when there is more than one class
of shareholders? In Kern, the railroad had preferred shareholders
who were to receive cumulative annual dividends of two dollars per
share so long as there were "net earnings available for dividends."
The corporation did not declare dividends on the preferred stock
in 1959 because the corporation claimed that earnings were approximately $18,000 below the amount needed to declare dividends.
However, the corporation had a wholly-owned subsidiary, Chicago
Heights Terminal Transfer Railroad, (CHTT), that had 1959 earnings of $392,000. The CHTT board had declared a dividend of
$300,000, which was reported as 1959 income by C&EI, but the
remaining $92,000 was not included in income. Had the $92,000
been included in income the preferred stockholders would have been
entitled to dividends.
What justification was there for the CHTT board, which obviously was completely under the control of C&EI, not declaring
the additional dividends? Unfortunately, the court did not directly
address this question. It held that the preferred shareholders were
not entitled to dividends. It argued, first, that under accounting
principles set by the Interstate Commerce Commission earnings of
subidiaries are not to be considered earnings of the parent until dividends are declared." While this is true, it of course says nothing
about whether dividends ought to have been declared. Secondly,
the court argued that an ICC decision'" refusing permission to C&EI
to merge with CHTT meant that the corporate identity of CHTT
was to be maintained and that any order compelling C&EI to inclue all CHTT earnings would amount to piercing the corporate
veil. While this might technically be correct, it still begs the question. Why didn't C&EI have a duty to order its CHTT directors
10.

6 Ill.
App. 3d 247, 285 N.E.2d 501 (1972).

11.

Under generally accepted accounting theory, however, it is considered

appropriate to prepare consolidated statements for a parent and a wholly-owned
subsidiary that are engaged in the same type of business. See R. WIXON & W.
KELL, ACCOUNTANT'S HANDBOOK

12.

§ 23, at 2-4 (5th ed. 1970).

Chicago and E. Ill. R.R. Merger, 312 I.C.C. 564 (1961).

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:220

to vote for a larger dividend? C&EI did not argue that it was serving some interest of its common shareholders by not declaring dividends. Had it so argued, the court clearly would have been required

to decide how a director should discharge his fiduciary duty when
there is a conflict betwen two classes of shareholders.' 8
Implicit in the court's decision is a determination that the CHTT

retention of $92,000 was in the best interests of CHTT. This suggests two questions. First, when are the interests of the subsidiary
to be considered apart from the interests of the consolidated corporation? In this instance concern for the subsidiary's interest seems
appropriate because of the ICC determination that the public interest

will best be served by maintenance of a separate identity of the subsidiary. Second, if the best interests of the subsidiary are to be
considered, how do we determine whether CHTT needed to retain
the $92,000? The court does not tell us that $50,000 was placed
in the corporation's mandatory sinking fund and that the balance
was kept in retained earnings. This information, however, is not
adequate to determine whether retention of the full $92,000 was
justified.
If corporations involved in this case had not been publicly regulated, it would have been more difficult for the court to reach the
same result because of the lack of any public interest argument for

retaining the independent identity of the corporation.
Kern provides at least two practical guidelines for attorneys. First,
fewer problems are likely to arise if the preferred stock is cumulative,
rather than cumulative-if-earned. 14 Second, in the unlikely event
13. Cf. Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 941 (1963), where the court sustained a recapitalization that
arguably discriminated against Class B shareholders in favor of Class A shareholders. Note, however, that 92% of the Class B shareholders had approved the
plan. In Kern no such approval existed or could have been obtained.
14. Nevertheless, the cumulative-if-earned provision does prevent the kind of
problem that arose in Cent. Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 Ill. 2d 566,
141 N.E.2d 45 (1957), where the amount of accrued preferred stock dividends arguably exceeded the value of the corporation. The use of non-cumulative preferred is rather rare and in any event can lead to problems as to whether in fact the
stock is actually non-cumulative. Guttman v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 189 F.2d 927 (2d
Cir. 1951); Sanders v. Cuba Ry., 21 N.J. 78, 120 A.2d 849 (1956); Bassett v.
United States Cast Iron Pipe and Foundry Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 668, 70 A. 929 (Ch.
1908), aff'd 75 N.J. Eq. 539, 73 A. 514 (Ct. Err. & App. 1909). For a general
discussion of the use of various types of preferred stock see 1 A. Dewing, THE
FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 131-148 (5th ed. 1953).

1973]

1 CORPORATIONS

that a Kern type problem arises, counsel for the corporation would
be safer in advising the company to have all earnings of the subsidiary passed on to the parent as a dividend."6
PURCHASE AND SALE OF CLOSE CORPORATION STOCK

The problems lurking in the purchase and sale of significant
blocks of stock in close corporations are numerous and offer a continuing challenge to the creative drafting skills of any attorney. Several cases decided during the past year illustrate such drafting problems.
In Siemans v. Thompson, 6 the plaintiff agreed to purchase 49
percent of the stock of Thompson Motor Sales, Inc. from Alan
Thompson, the sole shareholder of the defendant corporation. The
agreement provided for a $6,000 down payment and additional payments of $7,000 per year for seven years. Further, both Siemans
and Thompson were to be employed by the corporation and receive
salaries of $1,000 per month plus bonuses. Everything went
smoothly for about a year; then the corporation fell upon hard times.
Thompson proposed that both he and Siemans refrain from drawing
their salaries until the cash position of the company improved. Siemans refused and two months later notified the defendant that he
was terminating the stock purchase agreement. He brought suit for
rescission of the contract and recovery of the value of his services
for the few months he had worked without pay.
In deciding the case, the court had to consider two different models of the Siemans-Thompson relationship, each of which would produce a different result. The court could have viewed Siemans and
Thompson as major shareholder-partners who were to share the entrepreneurial risk. This view would have resulted in Siemans being
held liable for the unpaid amount due on the stock purchase agreement. Alternatively, the court could have viewed Siemans as just
another hired hand of the corporation (controlled by Thompson)
who had been given additional compensation in the form of the right
to purchase stock in the company. Under this view, Siemans would
15. Dividends received by a parent corporation from a wholly-owned subsidiary
are completely excluded from income for tax purposes so long as the appropriate
affiliated group election has been made. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 243.
16. 11 Ill. App. 3d 856, 297 N.E.2d 241 (1973).
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have recovered for unpaid salary. (The implications of this view
on the stock purchase agreement will be reviewed later). Based
on the above recitation of facts. I think that most corporate
attorneys would conclude that the shareholder/partner model was
more appropriate; the court thought otherwise. It viewed the key
issue as whether the employment agreement and the stock purchase
agreement were divisible. Concluding that they were not, the court
said:
[O]ne intending to purchase a share of a busineso and to help manage,
operate and obtain his livelihood from that business would hardly have an
interest in the purchase provision if he was deprived of his status of em17
ployee-manager.

This conclusion is unsatisfactory. It is true that one would not
want to purchase stock if he were depending on the corporation for
his livelihood and he knew that the corporation would soon be unable to pay him. But here the agreement between the parties reflects
no consideration of the possibility of the economic decline of the
business. The court concludes that the entire downside risk is to
be borne by Thompson for a period of at least seven years. 18 While
it is possible that the parties so intended, there is not one shred
of evidence cited by the court to support this view.
This case underlines the importance of considering the result desired should the business fail to prosper. Surely this consideration
would not surprise most attorneys, yet it was apparently overlooked
by counsel in this case. 19
Two recent cases involved alleged misrepresentations of corporate
financial condition in conjunction with the sale of a corporation.
In Sher v. Robin20 the plaintiff sought rescission of his contract to
purchase all the capital stock of North Shore Speed and Auto, Inc.
Plaintiff alleged that during the course of negotiations he was shown
an unaudited income statement which understated the cost of goods
sold by $24,000 and therefore overstated the gross profit margin
17. 11 111. App. 3d at 858, 297 N.E.2d at 243.
18. Taken to its logical extreme, the court's position would require rescission
of the stock purchase agreement any time Siemans was dismissed from employment,
without cause, even if twenty years had passed.
19. It is, of course, possible that counsel was not involved in drafting the agreement, although my hunch is otherwise.
20. 53 Ill. 2d 301, 291 N.E.2d 801 (1973).
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by over 10 percent. However, the income statement was not part
of the contract and there were no warranties regarding income or
gross profit margins. From the standpoint of the buyer such an
omission is obviously inexcusable. If the buyer was relying on the
business's past earnings record as a basis for determining the amount
he was willing to pay for the business, then past income was
clearly material and it should have been referred to in the contract.
On the other hand, if the buyer was mainly buying assets, then he
would have expected, at a minimum, that a representation of the
assets of the company would appear in the contract.
Such a representation was contained in the agreement in dispute
in Medigroup, Inc. v. Schildknecht.21 The agreement there warranted that the balance sheets were "accurate and that there would
be no changes before the closing except in the ordinary course of
business. '"22 This type of warranty, along with a warranty regarding
past income, would have protected the buyer in Sher. Unfortunately,
it did not provide complete protection for the buyer in Medigroup
because a dispute arose over whether certain debts that were not
stated in the financial statements relied on were pre-existing or subsequently incurred in the ordinary course of business.
The problem faced by the court when no warranties appear in
the contract is whether to imply warranties. While implied warranties are certainly no strangers to the law, it is still necessary to have
some factual and/or policy reasons for implying warranties. The
court seems to be taking the position that whenever a seller shows
unaudited financial statements to a buyer, he thereby warrants the
accuracy of the statements. This position can lead to unjust results.
Where the buyer has been given an opportunity to inspect all financial records and has relied on his inspection rather than representations, there does not appear to be any reason why the seller should
be saddled with implied warranties.
In Sher the buyer did inspect the financial records and, therefore,
it would seem that the only question was whether he justifiably relied
on the unaudited statements. Justice Goldenhersh, in his dissenting
opinion, clearly thought that he did not, pointing in particular to
21.

463 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1972).

22.

Id. at 528.
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the absence of warranties regarding past income and the inclusion
of warranties regarding certain specific financial items (none of
which were breached).
Sher and Medigroup read together illustrate the importance of
precisely spelling out the financial data upon which the parties are
and are not relying. Counsel for a seller in a situation such as
Sher should include in the agreement a specific disclaimer of warranties and an affirmative statement regarding the inspection opportunities that have been provided to the buyer. Medigroup illustrates
the potential danger to both parties of relying on the very commonly
used clause stating that no transactions other than in the ordinary
course of business will transpire between the signing of the contract
and the closing. To the extent possible, counsel must probe to determine what types of borderline transactions have a reasonable
chance of occurring during the pre-closing period.
OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS

Litigation involving close corporation shareholders who formerly
were congenial business associates is a recurring courtroom phenomenon. Conflicts of this type can often be avoided through proper
counseling and shareholder agreement at the time the business venture is begun. However, even a comprehensive shareholder agreement does not guarantee that litigation will not arise.
In Gray v. Hall2" agreement between the shareholders did not
prevent litigation. Three shareholders formed a company to manufacture refrigeration valves. Townsend was the designer, Hall the
supervisor of manufacturing and Gray the director of sales. Once
the business was under way both Townsend and Hall devoted full
time to the company's affairs, even though they concurrently were
operating an engineering project partnership which provided the corporation with most of its business.24 The corporate stock was divided equally among the three shareholders.
They had an agreement that provided for a first right of refusal
in the event that any one of the shareholders wanted to sell his stock.
23. 10 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 295 N.E.2d 506 (1973).
24. It is unclear how Hall and Townsend could have been considered full time
employees of the corporation at the same time that they had what was apparently a
flourishing partnership business. This discrepancy, however, had no apparent significance to the court.
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Nonetheless, after about two years of operation, Hall obtained
Townsend's stock in exhange for Hall's interest in the partnership.
Although he apparently knew about the transaction, until the time
of litigation Gray did not attempt to enforce his right to purchase
his pro rata share of Townsend's stock. Therefore, the court held
that he had waived his contractual right by waiting more than
eight years to bring suit.
During the eight year period Hall, as the owner of two-thirds of the
stock unilaterally made all corporate decisions, including raising his
salary and authorizing the move of the corporate business from Illinois to North Carolina. These latter two acts were the main grievances which Gray sought to have redressed. Since the shareholder
agreement apparently said nothing about salary or place of business,
Gray had to find some other theory on which to base his action.
His strategic position was weak because of the court's determination
that Hall was the rightful owner of two-thirds of the stock, thereby
giving Hall control of the board of directors, 5 the right to manage
the affairs of the corporation and to establish all directors' compen20
sation.
Gray was forced to argue that Hall's conduct was "oppressive"
within the meaning of section 86 of the Illinois Business Corporation Act.17 A finding of oppression allows the court to dissolve
the corporation and distribute its assets to the shareholders. However, since the statute does not define "oppressive," the court had
to find guidance from a prior statement by the Illinois Supreme
Court:
The word "oppressive" does not carry an essential inference of imminent
disaster....

"fraudulent."

28

[It is not] substantially synonymous with "illegal"

and

This definition, however, simply emphasizes that oppression is something to be determined by the court in the exercise of its general
equitable powers. The Gray court does indicate that one method
for determining whether oppression exists is to apply a comparability
25. There apparently was no regularly functioning board. One meeting was
held in 1968. 10 Ill. App. 3d at 1033, 295 N.E.2d at 508.
26. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.33 (1971).
27. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.86 (1971).
28. Cent. Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 111. 2d 566, 573-74, 141 N.E.2d
45, 50 (1956).

230

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:220

test, i.e., to look at actions of similarly situated companies. The
Gray court avoided the difficult task of applying this test by remanding the case for an accounting in order to determine all the facts.
Dissolution because of oppressive acts was granted in Compton
v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co."9 The case involved a dispute between two major shareholders ° of a close corporation in a situation
where there was a violation of a shareholders' agreement. The
agreement specified that defendant Harding would be president of
the corporation and draw a salary of $175 per week while the
plaintiff Compton would be executive vice president. In ordering
the corporation dissolved the court found that Harding's conduct
was oppressive because he had been "arbitrary, overbearing and
heavy-handed" 31 in running the corporation. Specifically, he not
only had increased his own salary above the amount specified in
the shareholders' agreement but also had not consulted Compton
with regard to management of the corporation-indeed no board
meetings were ever held. Furthermore, he was dilatory in responding to Compton's requests for information.
In ordering repayment of Harding's excess salary and dissolution
of the corporation, the court may very well have reached the fairest
result possible. However, it is difficult to be sure on the basis of
the facts stated in the opinion. Surely it is not an obvious proposition that dissolution is the appropriate remedy for excess salary payments. The court could have simply ordered Harding to repay the
excess amount to the company and instructed him not to draw additional amounts without approval of Compton. Similarly, the court
could have ordered the corporation to hold periodic board meetings.
While Harding's "imperious attitude" toward Compton might have
made working relations between them difficult, it is not clear that
a personality clash is sufficient to justify dissolution.
In deciding whether to order dissolution for oppression a court
not only should determine whether there have been oppressive acts
but also must determine whether dissolution is the appropriate rem29. 6 111. App. 3d 488, 285 N.E.2d 574 (1973).
30. There was a third shareholder, Compton's brother, who held an unspecified
amount of stock.
31. 6 Ill.
App. 3d at 499, 285 N.E.2d at 581.
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edy.32 Unfortunately, the Compton court did not analyze the probable alternative results of both dissolution and continuation of the
business.
Both Gray and Compton illustrate that a shareholders' agreement often fails to anticipate the types of problems that may subsequently be confronted. The attorney who is asked to draft a shareholders' agreement cannot possibly foresee every contingency that
might arise. Nevertheless, careful thought should be given to providing mechanisms for dispute settlement that will avoid or at least
reduce the likelihood of litigation. 83 There are several possibilities,
although none of them are free from difficulty. First, the agreement
might provide for an automatic buyout right in the event either party
petitions for dissolution. There is, of course, a danger here that
a wealthy shareholder might use this as a means of forcing out an
impecunious shareholder. Second, the agreement might provide for
submission of the dispute to arbitration. The problem here, of
course, is that generally it would seem unwise to have the company
run by an arbitrator for an extended period of time. Third, the
parties might agree to an automatic increase in the board of directors
with the election of a previously determined provisional director.
This, of course, has the same problem as arbitration with the additional difficulty of having to specify the arbitrator in advance. Finally, the parties might consider limiting the life of the corporation
to a relatively short period, e.g., five to ten years, thereby forcing
a periodic renegotiation in order to allow the business to continue.
This can, of course, cause inequities that are impossible to forecast
at the time the agreement is drawn.

32. See generally Chayes, Madame Wagner and the Close Corporation,
73 HARv. L. REv. 1532 (1960).
33. See O'Connell, Dissolution as a Remedy for Dissension and Deadlock in
the New York Closely-Held Corporation, 19 BUFF. L. REv. 585, 593-95 (1970).

